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One important puzzle in international political economy is why lower-earning and less-skilled intensive
industries tend to receive relatively high levels of trade protection.  This pattern of protection holds
even in low-income countries in which less-skilled labor is likely to be the relatively abundant factor
of production and therefore would be expected in many standard political-economy frameworks to
receive relatively low, not high, levels of protection.  We propose and model one possible explanation:
that individual aversion to inequality—both envy and altruism—lead to systematic differences in support
for trade protection across industries, with sectors employing lower-earning workers more intensively
being relatively preferred recipients for trade protection.  We conduct original survey experiments in
China and the United States and provide strong evidence that individual policy opinions about sector-specific
trade protection depend on the earnings of workers in the sector.  We also present structural estimates
of the influence of envy and altruism on sector-specific trade policy preferences.  Our estimates indicate
that both envy and altruism influence support for trade protection in the United States and that altruism
influences policy opinions in China.
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One important puzzle in international political economy is why lower-earning and less-skilled
intensive industries tend to receive relatively high levels of trade protection. Because this
pattern of protection holds even in low-income countries in which less-skilled labor is likely to
be the relatively abundant factor of production, it is arguably at odds with the common em-
pirical ￿nding that declining, comparative disadvantage industries are more likely to receive
protection. Moreover, it is at odds with most theoretical political economy models which tend
to either predict, consistent with most empirical work, that losing sectors from international
trade receive more protection or that expanding sectors that gain from greater trade should
enjoy more government support. Existing accounts are generally good at explaining support
for winners or for losers. They are not, however, good at explaining why winning sectors
are supported in some countries and losing sectors in others, and they do not explain why
lower-earning sectors seem to be advantaged in the contest for government support in almost
all countries. Our paper analyzes this puzzle in two steps.
First, we propose and model one possible explanation: that individual preferences over
trade policy are shaped by considerations of others, above and beyond one￿ s own income. A
growing literature has explored theoretically and empirically the possibility that individuals
may have "other-regarding" preferences.1 One important approach assumes that individual
utility functions depend not only on the individual￿ s own material payo⁄ but also on the
material payo⁄s that others receive. These interdependent, social preferences could include
everything from altruism, for which utility increases with the well being of other people, to
spitefulness, for which utility decreases in the well being of others.
Our model of trade policy incorporates the form of social preferences known as "inequity
aversion," in which individuals are altruistic toward others if their material payo⁄s are be-
low an equitable benchmark but envious of others whose payo⁄s are above this level (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999). We show how individual attitudes about inequality￿ both envy and
altruism￿ lead to systematic di⁄erences in support for trade protection across industries
1For reviews, see Sobel (2005), Fehr and Schmidt (2006), Levitt and List (2007), and DellaVigna (2009).
1with sectors employing lower-earning workers more intensively being relatively preferred re-
cipients for trade protection. The essence of our argument is that if individual citizens and
policymakers care not only about how trade policy in￿ uences their real incomes but also
how it a⁄ects their incomes relative to others, with a preference for policies that promote
income equality, then government policies will tend to support industries that employ lower-
earning, less-skilled workers more intensively. Importantly, we suggest the possibility that
these preferences will be observed across lots of di⁄erent types of countries and will in￿ u-
ence the observed sectoral distribution of trade protection across countries with very di⁄erent
factor endowments and political institutions.
The second step of our paper is to evaluate the argument empirically through the analysis
of original survey experiments on national samples of citizens in China and the United States.
These analyses include two main tests. First, in a survey question, we randomly assign the
average wage of the worker in the industry under consideration for trade protection and
estimate the e⁄ect of variation in workers￿wages on support for sectoral trade protection. In
both China and the United States, we ￿nd that sectors with lower average incomes receive
broader support for trade protection. Second, we derive from our model and estimate an
equation of policy preferences and we ￿nd evidence that the social preferences assumed in
our model do in￿ uence support for sector-speci￿c trade protection.
Our estimates for the United States indicate that support for sector-speci￿c trade pro-
tection depends on both altruism and envy. Increasing our measure of altruism (the gap by
which a respondent￿ s income exceeds the income of the typical worker in the sector being
considered for increased trade protection) by two standard deviations (a $48,400 annual dif-
ference) raises the probability that respondents support trade protection by 18 percentage
points (about a 59% increase). Similarly, increasing the measure of envy (the gap by which
a respondent￿ s income lies below the income of the typical worker in the sector being consid-
ered for increased trade protection) by two standard deviations (a $48,800 annual di⁄erence),
lowers the probability that respondents support trade protection by 16 percentage points
(about a 53% decrease). Our estimates for China indicate that support for sector-speci￿c
2trade protection depends on altruism but provides little evidence of a substantively impor-
tant e⁄ect for envy. Increasing the measure of altruism by two standard deviations (a 2,680
yuan di⁄erence on a monthly basis) raises the probability that respondents support trade
protection by almost 17 percentage points (about a 37% increase). We also present evidence
from a follow-up experiment in the United States that social preferences remain important
for understanding variation in support for sectoral trade protection when the ine¢ ciency of
the policy is made more salient.
Overall, our analysis ￿nds substantial evidence that Chinese and American citizens exhibit
inequity aversion in their preferences for sector-speci￿c trade protection. In turn, this feature
of preferences can explain the puzzle of lower-earning sectors receiving greater trade protec-
tion in so many countries around the world. Such preferences would be in￿ uential across a
wide variety of political economy models of trade including standard lobbying models such
as Grossman and Helpman￿ s (1994) protection-for-sale model. Moreover, the paper builds
on recent contributions by Rotemberg (2003), Freund and Ozden (2008), and Tovar (2009),
which also adopt nonstandard preferences to explain patterns of trade policy. The approach
in those papers is to suggest if voters had certain types of preferences, certain anomalies in
observed trade policymaking could be resolved. Our paper takes a similar approach but also
provides evidence that such preferences are actually observed in the area of trade policymak-
ing. This feature of the paper also contributes to the literature on the determinants of trade
policy opinions, for which various departures from self-interest have been considered.2
Beyond trade policy, our paper provides a new methodology for investigating the role of
envy and altruism in determining policy preferences. This general strategy could be ap-
plied to many other areas of economic policymaking for which envy and altruism may be
in￿ uential in opinion formation. Finally, our paper contributes to the broader behavioral
economics literature on social preferences. Much of the empirical evidence in this litera-
ture that individuals have other-regarding preferences is based on how subjects behave in a
2Previous research on trade preferences includes, among others, Scheve and Slaughter (2001a), O￿ Rourke
and Sinnott (2001), Baker (2005), Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt (2005), Mayda and Rodrik (2005), and
Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006).
3laboratory setting playing abstract games.3 Our analysis of policy opinions using survey ex-
periments provides evidence of such preferences in a real political economy setting. Although
responses to survey questions are costless, it is precisely these responses and the factors that
drive them that policymakers respond to in the policymaking process. As such, evidence of
social preferences in policy opinions as presented in this paper suggests one way that the
other-regarding behavior observed in so many laboratory environments may in￿ uence actual
political-economic outcomes.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we document the puzzle that
lower-earning, less-skilled sectors receive more trade protection in many countries around
the world. In Section 3, we model trade policy preferences in a setting in which individual
preferences display inequity aversion. Our empirical analysis of the role of inequality aversion
in sector-speci￿c trade preferences in the United States and China is in Section 4, and Section
5 o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
2 The Puzzle: Sectoral Wages and the Distribution of Trade
Protection
This section provides descriptive evidence that for a broad sample of countries, low-earning,
less￿ skilled intensive industries receive relatively high levels of trade protection. This pattern
of protection holds even in low-income countries in which less-skilled labor is likely to be the
relatively abundant factor of production and therefore would be expected in many standard
explanations of the determinants of trade policy to receive relatively low, not high, levels of
protection.
Figure 1 plots trade-weighted tari⁄s in United States manufacturing industries in 2000
against normalized average wages in those sectors.4 This graph shows a familiar pattern to
3See Levitt and List (2007) for a skeptical review of the real world importance of social preferences observed
in laboratory settings but also DellaVigna (2009) for reasons why laboratory results may both over and under-
estimate the empirical importance of other-regarding preferences.
4The data are for 4-digit, ISIC, revision 3 manufacuturing sectors. The source for the tari⁄ data is the
TRAINS database. The source for the wage data is the most recent UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database
(INDSTAT4 2008 ISIC Rev. 3). The outlier industry in the upper right of the graph is Tobacco Products,
4students of trade policymaking in the United States. Tari⁄s are relatively low in the United
States but those industries that use lower-skilled, lower-paid workers more intensively receive
higher levels of trade protection. This graph would look very similar employing alternative
measures of trade protection and skill intensity.
The most common explanation for the pattern of trade protection observed in this and
similar graphs is that comparative disadvantage sectors￿ losers from expanding trade￿ get
more protection. A large empirical literature has documented the tendency of governments
to provide greater trade protection to declining industries. In the United States and Europe
for example, heavily protected industries include textiles, footwear, clothing, and agriculture
which have been contracting for decades. Gawande and Krishna (2003) and Baldwin and
Robert-Nicoud (2007) review a number of alternative measures that have been documented
to be correlated with higher levels of trade protection in declining industries. These include
industry growth rates in terms of output and employment and changes in import penetration
ratios. The general idea is simply that governments tend to pick losers when they intervene
to support domestic industries.
The reasons for this pattern of intervention are not obvious. As Baldwin and Robert-
Nicoud (2007) note, the dominant approach for explaining which industries get protected is
various lobbying models and there are good reasons to think that larger, expanding industries
would have more resources for lobbying governments to support their businesses.5 Some
explanations for this phenomenon include the idea that losing sectors lobby harder because
rents from lobbying are not competed away through entry of new ￿rms, at least as long as
the bene￿ts of protection are not too great (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2007). Grossman
and Helpman (1996) focus on the possibility that the asymmetry in lobbying e⁄ort may be
due to greater free riding in expanding sectors. Krueger (1990) argues that policymakers
privilege declining industries because this supports the income of known workers whereas
supporting expanding sectors supports unknown bene￿ciaries. A number of papers have
which is an outlier in many other countries as well.
5See, for example, Olson (1965), Stilger (1971), Peltzman (1976), Hillman (1982), Milner (1987), Grossman
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Figure 1: Import-Weighted Applied Tari⁄s and Average Wages in U.S. Manufacturing in 2000.
This ￿gure plots import-weighted applied tari⁄s in 4-digit, ISIC, Revision 3 manufacturing
industries in the United States in 2000 against normalized average wages in these industries.
See text for sources.
suggested various ways in which policymakers and/or citizens may be generally averse to
income losses and that this aversion directly a⁄ects how governments set policy in declining
and expanding industries (Freund and Ozden 2008, Tovar 2009, Corden 1974).6
One implication of the idea that governments tend to support declining sectors is that we
should expect signi￿cant di⁄erences across countries in the distribution of trade protection
across di⁄erent sectors of the economy. While some losing sectors may be common across
all countries due to changes in technology or consumer tastes, many changes in the fortunes
of industries will re￿ ect di⁄erences in comparative advantage across countries. For example,
it is not an accident that commonly cited declining industries in the United States include
6See Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) for a more complete review.
6textiles, footwear, and toys. These industries are declining in the U.S. in part because they use
less-skilled labor intensively, a factor with which the U.S. is not well endowed. In contrast,
these industries have been expanding in other countries that are abundant in less-skilled
workers. More generally, to the extent that winning and losing sectors are in part determined
by comparative advantage, we would expect that patterns of trade protection vary across
countries according to their relative factor endowments.
To investigate this question further, Figure 2 plots trade-weighted tari⁄s in Chinese man-
ufacturing industries in 2000 against normalized average wages in those sectors.7 While the
level of tari⁄s in China is higher than the United States, what is striking about this graph
is how similar the distribution of protection by factor intensity is compared to the United
States. Those sectors which employ less-skilled, lower-paid workers more intensively have
higher levels of trade protection. This is evident both in the handful of very high tari⁄ sec-
tors but also when considering only those sectors with applied tari⁄ rates below 40%. Under
the common empirical claim that China is relatively well-endowed with less-skilled workers,
the pattern of protection described in this graph is not easily explained by describing these
sectors as losing sectors as in the U.S. case.
There are, nonetheless, reasons that lower-paid sectors might be declining in China. For
example, sectors for which state owned enterprises are large employers may be experiencing
employment declines as competition increases. More generally, as China develops wages are
increasing, which may erode its comparative advantage in some sectors. That said, Figure 2
suggests the possibility that lower-paying and less-skilled intensive sectors are more likely to
get greater trade protection in a setting in which we would expect these sectors to generally
be comparative advantage industries. This pattern of trade protection has also been noted
for several other developing countries in previous research.8
7The data are for 4-digit, ISIC, revision 3 manufacuturing sectors. The source for the tari⁄ data is again
the TRAINS database. The Chinese wage data was obtained from the China Data Centre at the University of
Michigan. The original dataset consists of over 500 4-digit industries under the Chinese Industrial Classi￿cation
System (GB/T 4754 - 1994). We then converted the data into 4-digit ISIC rev.3 based on the concordances in
The People￿ s Republic of China Standards: Industrial Classi￿cation for National Economic Activities (2002).
8See, e.g., Hanson and Harrison (1999) for evidence from Mexico, Currie and Harrison (1997) for evidence
from Morocco, and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) for Colombia and general discussion in Goldberg and Pavc-
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Figure 2: Import-Weighted Applied Tari⁄s and Average Wages in Chinese Manufacturing in
2000. This ￿gure plots import-weighted applied tari⁄s in 4-digit, ISIC, Revision 3 manufac-
turing industries in China in 2000 against normalized average wages in these industries. See
text for sources.
8To investigate this possibility more systematically, we examine the correlation of trade
protection and skill intensity in a large cross-section of countries. Our data for this analysis
are from the Trade, Production and Protection (1976-2004) World Bank dataset arranged by
Alessandro Nicita and Marcelo Olarreaga.9 This dataset contains variables on trade, produc-
tion, and protection in 28 manufacturing sectors (3-digit, ISIC rev.2). For each country, we
picked a year close to 2001 for which data was available to calculate trade-weighted tari⁄s
and average industry wages. We then calculated Spearman￿ s rank correlation coe¢ cient for
the tari⁄ and wage data. Spearman￿ s rank correlation is essentially a Pearson￿ s correlation
coe¢ cient on the ranks and average ranks of each variable. A negative Spearman￿ s rank
correlation coe¢ cient here indicates that the industry ranks for tari⁄s and average wages are
negatively correlated with lower wage industries receiving relatively greater tari⁄ protection.
We report these results for trade-weighted tari⁄s; the results look quite similar for simple
average tari⁄s.10
Figure 3 plots the Spearman rank correlation between weighted tari⁄s and average wages
in 3-digit ISIC, revision 2 manufacturing industries in each country against GDP per capita.11
The ￿gure reveals two signi￿cant patterns in the data. First, for all but two of the coun-
tries, the Spearman￿ s rank correlation coe¢ cient is negative indicating that in almost every
country industries with lower wages receive greater protection. Second, the magnitude of
this correlation does not vary across countries by GDP per capita. If we treat GDP per
capita as a rough measure of human/physical capital endowments, this suggests that there
is little evidence in this data that comparative advantage is driving the distribution of trade
protection across sectors.
Figure 3 presents a puzzle for the literature on trade protection: why do industries that
employ lower-paid, less-skilled workers more intensively get greater trade protection across all
transitions to democracy.
9See http://go.worldbank.org/EQW3W5UTP0.
10The graphs reported also exclude tobacco products for all countries because this sector is almost always a
signi￿cant outlier in each country. The results are qualitatively similar if tobacco products is included though
it does somewhat attenuate the negative correlations.
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Figure 3: Correlation of Protection and Wages by Endowment. This ￿gure plots the Spear-
man rank correlation between weighted tari⁄s and average wages in 3-digit ISIC, revision 2
manufacturing industries in each country against GDP per capita. See text for sources.
10types of countries.12 This pattern of industrial trade protection is puzzling because it holds
even in low-income countries in which less-skilled labor is likely to be the relatively abundant
factor of production and therefore would be expected in many standard explanations of the
determinants of trade policy to receive relatively low, not high, levels of protection.13
3 A Social Concerns Model of Trade Protection
The data reviewed in the previous section show that sectors that employ lower-paid, less-
skilled workers more intensively receive greater trade protection across countries with very
di⁄erent factor endowments. There are a number of alternative explanations for this pattern
of protection. For example, it may be that tari⁄ levels are constrained by GATT and WTO
commitments and these policies are dominated by the domestic political interests of relatively
wealthy countries for which losing sectors certainly do include industries that employ less-
skilled workers more intensively. Another alternative might be that lower paid sectors lobby
harder because their opportunity costs for lobbying are lower. Another possibility which we
explore is that individual citizens and policymakers care not only about how trade policy
in￿ uences their real incomes but also how it a⁄ects their incomes relative to others, with a
preference for policies that promote income equality. As a result, policies that support the
incomes of low earners are favored in the policymaking process.14
A growing literature has explored theoretically and empirically the possibility that some
individuals may have other regarding preferences. Sobel (2005), Fehr and Schmidt (2006),
12We also examined some alternative ways to investigate the possibility that low-earning, low-skilled sectors
generally receive greater levels of trade protection. For example, we calculated the di⁄erence between the
median trade-weighted tari⁄ in industries with average wages above the median pay industry and the median
trade-weighted tari⁄ in industries below the median pay industry and show that this statistic is never positive
and mostly negative in our sample countries and that these di⁄erences are if anything larger in countries with
relatively lower GDP per capita. These patterns are consistent with those reported in Figure 3.
13In unreported analyses, we explored the robustness of the correlation between average wages and levels
of protection by examining industry panel data for the United States and China between 1998 and 2004.
This allowed us to evaluate if within-industry changes overtime in relative skills or earnings are negatively
correlated with changes in levels of protection in two countries with very di⁄erent factor endowments. For a
host of regression speci￿cations and estimation techniques that account for a wide range of measurement and
endogeneity issues, we indeed ￿nd this prediction to hold true. In our Chinese data, a two-standard-deviation
increase in an industry￿ s average wage is associated with a 34% decline in that industry￿ s tari⁄. In our U.S.
data, the analogous drop is estimated to be about 45%.
14See Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) for discussion of a couple of other alternative explanations.
11and DellaVigna (2009) provide reviews of the empirical evidence of these preferences and
various theoretical frameworks for understanding this evidence. One signi￿cant approach in
this literature is models of social preferences which assume that individual utility functions
depend not only on the individual￿ s own material payo⁄ but also on the material payo⁄s
that others receive. The main idea is that individuals maximize their utility as they would in
more conventional self-interested models but they do not solely care about their own material
outcomes. These social preferences could include everything from altruism, for which utility
increases with the well being of other people, to spitefulness, for which utility decreases in
the well being of others.
One in￿ uential form of social preference is inequity aversion. Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
for example, posit that individuals are altruistic toward others if their material payo⁄s are
below an equitable benchmark but envious of others whose payo⁄s are above this level.
They propose a simple utility function to capture this idea and argue that it is consistent
with behavior commonly observed in a wide variety of experimental social interactions such
as dictator games, ultimatum games, trust games, public good games, punishment games,
and gift exchange games.15 Empirically the claim is not that all individuals are averse to
inequality but that there are at least a signi￿cant proportion of individuals who are and that
this preference has an important e⁄ect on social interactions.
In this section, we apply the idea of inequality aversion to the problem of trade policy-
making. Our argument is that if individual citizens and policymakers care not only about
how trade policy in￿ uences their real incomes but also how it a⁄ects their incomes relative to
others, with a preference for policies that promote income equality, government policies will
tend to support industries that employ lower-earning, less-skilled workers more intensively.
Importantly, we suggest the possibility that these preferences will be observed across lots
of di⁄erent types of countries and will in￿ uence the observed sectoral distribution of trade
protection across countries with very di⁄erent factor endowments and political institutions.
Our argument is related to an older literature that suggested the possibility that gov-
15See Charness and Rabin (2002) for an important related alternative formalization of social preferences
and Sobel (2005) for a more general review.
12ernments use trade policy to combat inequality. For example, ￿social change￿ arguments
discussed in Gawande and Krishna (2003), Baldwin (1985), Ball (1967), Constantopoulos
(1974) and Corden (1974) are all related to the idea that reducing inequality might be one
explanation for why governments in the United States and Europe seem to favor declining
sectors that employ less-skilled workers more intensively. More recently, Davidson, Matusz,
and Nelson (2006) argue that inequality aversion is important for understanding trade poli-
tics. Limao and Panagariya (2007) address the question of why trade policy is biased toward
import-competing sectors￿ and therefore restricts rather than increases trade￿ and show that
this bias may be a consequence of government concern about inequality.
Our theoretical model closely follows standard political economy trade models with the
key di⁄erence being that individuals in our model care about their own incomes and their
incomes relative to others￿ they are motivated by both envy and altruism.16 The model
focuses on identifying how envy and altruism in￿ uence preferences about trade protection
in a standard setting, and then we discuss how such preferences may in￿ uence policymaking
outcomes in diverse institutional settings.
In a perfectly competitive economy with a population size of N and n sectors, individuals
maximize the utility function given by













maxfIi ￿ Ij;0g (1)
This utility function has two components: utility from consumption (x0+
Pn
i=1 ui(xi)) and
disutility from inequality aversion (￿ ￿
n￿1
P




i6=j maxfIi ￿ Ij;0g).
Goods/sectors and types of individuals￿ as all individuals within a sector are identical￿ are
indexed by i, i = 1;2;:::n. x0 is the consumption of the numeraire good 0 and xi is the
consumption of non-numeraire good i. The utility functions ui(￿) are increasing functions
which are di⁄erentiable, separable, and strictly concave.
To account for inequality aversion, we incorporate a social preference term into the in-
16Speci￿cally, we adopt the same assumptions and notation for the economic environment as in Grossman
and Helpman (1994) except for the speci￿cation of individual utility functions.
13dividual￿ s utility function. The term for inequality aversion is same as the speci￿cation in
Equation (1) in Fehr and Schmidt (1999: 822). In particular, Fehr and Schmidt specify one
parameter (￿) for ￿altruism" when Ii > I￿i; and the other parameter for ￿envy" (￿) when
Ii < I￿i. This speci￿cation of the utility function implies that an individual would feel al-
truistic to those who earn less than him/her, and at the same time feel envious of those who
earn more.
Let ￿i indicate the fraction of population N working in sector i, and we assume that
workers in sector i all earn identical incomes which are a function of their labor and the return
to sector-speci￿c skills and/or inputs owned only by individuals working in each respective
sector. Note that an individual owns at most one type of sector-speci￿c input, and we
assume the sector-speci￿c factor input is indivisible and non-tradable. The technologies
to produce these goods have constant returns to scale, and the speci￿c factor inputs have
inelastic supplies. The numeraire good 0 is produced with labor alone and sets the economy-
wide return to labor. The non-numeraire good i is produced with labor and the sector-speci￿c
factor input. We normalize the wage of good 0 to 1, and the aggregate reward to the speci￿c
factor depends on the domestic price of the good, that is, ￿i(pi); where pi is the domestic




￿i￿1N . The total
income (Ii) to an individual in sector i, is equal to their wage of 1 plus
￿i(pi)
￿iN . Individual
consumption must meet the budget constraint such that Ii ￿ x0 +
n P
i=1
pixi. We also denote
the exogenous world price of goods to be p￿
i.









where di(pi) is the demand function of good i by an individual, and di(￿) equals to
the inverse of u0
i(xi), and yi(pi) is the domestic output of good i and yi(pi) = ￿0
i(pi):
p = (p1;p2;:::pn) is a vector of domestic prices of the non-numeraire goods. Each individ-





i pidi(pi). Given these assumptions, we can derive individuals￿
14indirect utility in sector i as follows:
Zi(p) = 1 +
￿i(pi)
￿iN
























Individual preferences about trade policy in sector j are determined by how a marginal























































if i = j (4c)
where mj(pj) ￿ Ndj(pj)￿yj(pj) is the net import function. Assuming good j is a normal
good, then yi(pi) = ￿0
i(pi) > 0. We also note that m0
j(pj) < 0. Hence, an increase of price for
good j will tend to reduce the welfare of individual i because of the net negative e⁄ect of the
impact on consumer welfare and tari⁄ revenue is 1
N[(pj ￿p￿
j)m0
j(pj)￿yj(pj)] < 0. Inequality
aversion means that an increase in the price for good j reduces the individual i￿ s welfare due









￿jN ). These two relationships imply that individuals considering whether to
support sector-speci￿c trade protection that would increase the price and incomes in another
15sector will, all else equal, be less likely to support barriers if they have a lower income than
workers in the industry under consideration for protection￿ envy e⁄ect￿ and more likely to
support barriers if they have a higher income than workers in the industry under consideration
for protection￿ altruism e⁄ect. Our empirical work will test this central feature of our model.
For i = j, individuals in this group will gain income from tari⁄ protection. However, the
e⁄ect of inequality aversion may either increase or decrease workers￿welfare, depending on
where sector i￿ s per capita factor endowment return falls in the overall income distribution
as well as on the degree of altruism and envy.
This model identi￿es how envy and altruism in￿ uence policy preferences about trade pro-
tection in a standard setting and provides clear empirical predictions that we will evaluate in
the next section of the paper. It is straightforward to see that the preferences described in
our model would tend to push policy outcomes in a direction for which lower-earning indus-
tries tend to receive higher levels of protection under a number of alternative assumptions
about the policymaking process￿ that is inequality aversion constitutes one possible answer
to the empirical puzzle documented in Section 2.
For example, suppose policy is chosen by a single individual in the society with the
preferences described above. This policymaker could be a citizen from the median industry,
or an individual elected to o¢ ce for reasons unrelated to trade policy, or a leader in a non-
democratic political regime. The exact policy selected for each industry by such a leader will
depend on the individual￿ s position in the income distribution and the relative magnitude of
the parameters in the model. That said, lower-paying industries are more likely to bene￿t
from the policymaker￿ s altruism and less likely to be punished by his or her envy yielding a
pattern of greater protection for lower-paying industries.
Another relatively simple way to think about the policy implications of our model of
preferences is to consider the case of a social welfare maximizing planner. In this setting,
aggregate envy toward workers in a sector will tend to lower protection in an industry while
aggregate altruism towards workers in a sector will tend to raise protection in a sector. Lower-
earning sectors will have lower levels of aggregate envy and higher levels of aggregate altruism
16and thus will be more likely to be protected than higher-earning sectors.17 Many political
economy models of trade are, in e⁄ect, models for which a policymaker weighs aggregate
welfare against some other gain such as lobbying contributions. To the extent that aggregate
welfare is in￿ uential at all in the policymaking process, inequality aversion is likely to push
policy toward greater protection for lower-earning sectors and less for higher-earning sectors.
One such political economy model is Grossman and Helpman￿ s ￿protection for sale￿the-
ory. This model is particularly instructive because it has been applied both theoretically
and empirically to countries with diverse political institutions and levels of economic devel-
opment. For example, policymakers in both democratic and non-democratic settings have
incentives to weigh aggregate welfare whether to win elections or to prevent revolutions or
coups. As such, inequality aversion can explain why low-earning sectors are more heav-
ily protected across countries with diverse political institutions. Importantly, however, in
the Grossman and Helpman model, the extent to which policymakers care about aggregate
welfare is only one mechanism by which inequality aversion privileges low-earning indus-
tries. Aggregate envy and altruism among organized sectors making contributions to the
policymaker will also tend to result in higher protection in lower-earning industries even if
the policymaker does not value aggregate welfare. This is an important insight because
it suggests one reason why even if there are di⁄erences across political institutions in the
extent to which policy is made in the interests of citizens￿ or how much aggregate welfare
is in￿ uential in policymaking￿ we would still expect envy and altruism among citizens to
move policy toward more protection in lower-earning industries. While it is certainly the
case, that the introduction of inequality aversion might have di⁄erent consequences under
alternative assumptions about either the economy or the political process, there are a wide
variety of economic and political settings under which inequality aversion would tend to push
both individual preferences and policy equilibria toward great protection for lower-earning
sectors of the economy.
17In this very simple economic setting, a welfare maximizing policymaker would choose no tari⁄s for many
sectors, but depending on the relative magnitude of the model￿ s parameters, some sectors would receive
protection and those sectors would be low-earning sectors with high aggregate altruism and low aggregate
envy.
174 Envy and Altruism in Trade-Policy Preferences
Section 2 presented evidence that sectors employing lower-paid, less-skilled workers more
intensively receive more protection across countries with diverse factor endowments and sug-
gested that this pattern of protection was not well accounted for in existing political economy
models. Section 3 argued that one possible explanation for this pattern of protection is that
individual preferences over trade policy are shaped by attitudes about inequality￿ both envy
and altruism￿ and demonstrated how both these factors imply relatively greater support for
policies that protect industries employing lower-earning workers more intensively.
In this section we use national samples of citizens in China and the United States to
provide two critical empirical tests in support of our model. First, we show that preferences
aggregated across all respondents in each country vary systematically with the treatment
income of industry workers: industries with lower-income workers receiving broader support
for trade protection. Second, we derive from our model and estimate an equation of policy
preferences, and we ￿nd that individuals have the social preferences of altruism and envy
assumed in our model in Section 3. Econometrically identifying these preferences lends
considerable support to our explanation of the trade-policy puzzle documented in Section 2.
4.1 Experimental Design
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to determine if individual policy preferences
about sector-speci￿c trade protection exhibit inequality aversion and, speci￿cally, to estimate
separately the envy and altruism parameters in the model presented in Section 3. Recall
from Equations (4a)-(4c) that a trade-policy induced increase in another sector￿ s price a⁄ects
individual utility (or sectoral utility since all individuals within a sector are assumed to be the
same) through three channels. First, it decreases the consumer surplus but increases tari⁄
revenue. Under standard assumptions, the net impact of these two e⁄ects is negative. Absent
social concerns, individuals in other sectors are worse o⁄ from trade protection. Second, if
the individual has a lower income than the sector under consideration for trade protection, he
or she su⁄ers an additional loss from envy. Third, if the individual has a higher income than
18the sector under consideration for trade protection, he or she bene￿ts from a trade-policy
induced increase in another sector￿ s price because of altruism.
To estimate the e⁄ect of envy and altruism on support for sector-speci￿c trade protec-
tion, we designed a survey experiment that randomly assigned respondents to consider trade
protection for industries with di⁄erent wage levels and recorded their support for sector-
speci￿c trade protection. In China, the experiment was conducted in face-to-face interviews
for a national sample of the Chinese adult population living in major cities and county-level
cities.18 In the United States, the experiment was conducted over the internet for a nationally
representative sample of the U.S. adult population.19 20
The English translation of the question that we asked to elicit support for sector-speci￿c
trade protection in China was:
There is an industry in China in which the average worker makes X yuan per
month. To increase the wages of workers in this industry, some people want the
government to limit imports of foreign products in this industry. Others oppose
these limits because such limits would raise prices that consumers pay and hurt
other industries. Do you favor or oppose limiting the import of foreign products
in this industry?
IF FAVOR: Do you strongly favor or only somewhat favor limiting the import
of foreign products in this industry?
IF OPPOSE: Do you strongly oppose or only somewhat oppose limiting the
import of foreign products in this industry?
The question that we asked to elicit support for sector-speci￿c trade protection in the
United States was:
There is an industry in the United States in which the average worker makes X
dollars per year. Some people favor establishing new trade barriers such as import
taxes and quotas because trade barriers would increase the wages of workers in
this industry. Others oppose new trade barriers because they would raise prices
that consumers pay and hurt other industries. Do you favor or oppose these new
trade barriers?
18The experiment was conducted by the Horizon Research Consultancy Group.
19The experiment was conducted by Knowledge Networks as part of their QuickView studies employing
respondents from their KnowledgePanel. For more information, see www.knowledgenetworks.com.
20Both experiments were reviewed and granted exemptions by Yale University￿ s Faculty of Arts and Sciences
Human Subjects Committee.
19IF FAVOR: Do you strongly favor or only somewhat favor new trade barriers
for this industry?
IF OPPOSE: Do you strongly oppose or only somewhat oppose new trade
barriers for this industry?
The value of X was assigned randomly across respondents to be equal to 1,000, 2,000, or
4,000 yuan in China and 18,000, 40,000, or 80,000 dollars in the United States. These values
were chosen so that respondents were considering trade protection for low, average, and high
wage industries. For example, in the U.S., the low value of $18,000 corresponds to an income
a bit higher than the total money income in 2007 for an adult who worked full-time, year-
round at the 10th percentile in the income distribution.21 Alternatively, one can think about
this low income amount as the wage earned by a worker who worked full-time, year round at
about $9.00 per hour or a bit higher than the minimum wage. The average value was selected
as a round value close to the median total money income in 2007 for an adult who worked
full-time, year-round of $41,245. Similarly, the high wage of $80,000 falls at about the 84th
percentile in the total money income distribution in 2007. The values for China correspond
to points in the 2007 monthly Chinese wage distribution similar to those used for the United
States.22 23
It is important to compare the wording of our survey question to other questions ex-
amined in the literature on the determinants of trade-policy opinions. This question asks
respondents whether they favor new trade barriers for a single industry and consequently
is more narrowly focused than typical question formats which elicit opinions about general
trade policy across an entire economy. Moreover, although not stated explicitly, our wording
implies that the industry in question is not the industry in which the respondent works. We
chose our question wording to correspond with the empirical puzzle of this paper which is
focused on the distribution of protection across industries and with our theoretical model
which assumes both that returns￿ income￿ to workers and policy setting is determined by
21The source for this data is the Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement,
Table PINC-02.
22See National Bureau of Statistics of China (2008) China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing: China Statistics
Press.
23Note that the slight di⁄erence in the English translation of the Chinese question arose from back translation
and pilot testing of the original U.S. question.
20industry.
The marginal responses to this question are consistent with the intention to elicit support
for sector-speci￿c trade policies. Speci￿cally, respondents are much less likely to give a
protectionist response when considering a single industry than when answering a question
about general trade policy. This is most clearly the case for the United States for which there
is a long record of polling public opinion about trade policy. In our U.S. survey, just 30.9%
of respondents favor new trade barriers while nearly 70% of respondents are opposed (44%
favor limiting imports with 56% opposed in the Chinese data).24 This ratio of two-to-one
against new sector-speci￿c trade barriers contrasts with responses to more general trade policy
questions which, depending on question wording, tend to elicit anywhere from two-to-one
support for further trade barriers to equal support and opposition to new barriers (see Scheve
and Slaughter 2001b, Chapter 2). There are many possible explanations for this di⁄erence in
marginal responses, including variation in the experimental treatments corresponding to the
average wage levels in the industry under consideration, but such responses are not surprising
given that the proposed policy change singles out a speci￿c industry for assistance.
4.2 Experimental Results
Our ￿rst set of empirical results report the basic ￿ndings from the experiment￿ that is the
e⁄ect of variation in the assumed average wage of the industry under consideration for trade
protection on support for sector-speci￿c trade protection.
We constructed two measures of support for new trade barriers based on responses to our
question. Trade Opinion 1 is set equal to 1 for respondents who favor new trade barriers and is
equal to zero for those opposed. Trade Opinion 2 is set equal to 1 for respondents who oppose
new trade barriers strongly, 2 for respondents who oppose new trade barriers somewhat, 3
for respondents who favor new trade barriers somewhat, and 4 for those who favor new trade
barriers strongly. Each of the measures is increasing in support for a protectionist policy.
Table 1 reports the mean estimates for each treatment category and di⁄erence-in-means
24Descriptive statistics are based on weighted averages though these di⁄ered little from the unweighted
averages.
21estimates for each combination of treatments. These results provide substantial evidence
that support for sector-speci￿c trade barriers are in￿ uenced by the average wage of workers
in the industry.
For China, support for limiting the import of foreign products is 7 percentage points
higher (a 16% increase) for respondents who considered protection for an industry with a low
wage versus respondents who considered protection for an industry with an average wage.
This di⁄erence was of a similar magnitude for respondents who considered protection for an
industry with a low wage versus respondents who considered protection for an industry with
a high wage. The results thus suggest for China a signi￿cant di⁄erence between respondents
receiving the low wage treatment and both the middle and high wage treatments but no
di⁄erence between the middle and high treatments.
In the United States, the results are even more striking. Support for new trade barriers is
8 percentage points higher (a 26% increase) for respondents who considered protection for an
industry with a low wage versus respondents who considered protection for an industry with
an average wage. This di⁄erence was nearly 19 percentage points (an over 90% increase) for
respondents who considered protection for an industry with a low wage versus respondents
who considered protection for an industry with a high wage. The di⁄erences between the
middle and high wage treatments are also substantively and statistically signi￿cant. It is
clear that support for sectoral trade protection is decreasing in the average wages of the sector
under consideration for trade protection.
Table 2 reports estimates of the di⁄erences across our treatment categories controlling for
various demographic characteristics of respondents and ￿xed e⁄ects for geographical location,
industry of employment, and interviewer. This framework allows identi￿cation of the treat-
ment e⁄ects within geographical location, industry, and other respondent characteristics. We
estimate the following ordinary least squares regressions:
TradeOpinion1i;k;j;l = ￿0+￿1MWTi;k;j;l+￿2HWTi;k;j;l+￿Xi;k;j;l+￿k+￿j+￿l+￿i;k;j;l (5)
22where the dependent variable Trade Opinion 1 is the dichotomous measure described
above and is increasing in support for trade protection;25 MWT, Middle Wage Treatment, is
a dichotomous measure equal to one if the respondent received the middle wage treatment
for that country and zero otherwise; HWT, High Wage Treatment, is a dichotomous measure
equal to one if the respondent received the high wage treatment for that country and zero
otherwise; X is a vector of demographic variables measuring education attainment, sex,
age, and income;26 ￿k are ￿xed e⁄ects for geographical location;27 ￿j are ￿xed e⁄ects for
industries;28 ￿l are ￿xed e⁄ects for interviewers (China only); ￿ is the error term; i, k, j,
and l index individuals, geographic locations, industries, and interviewers respectively; and
￿0, ￿1, ￿2, and ￿ are parameters to be estimated. The omitted treatment category is Low
Wage Treatment and so the parameters ￿1 and ￿2 should be interpreted respectively as the
e⁄ect of being exposed to the middle and high wage treatments compared to the low wage
treatment.
The estimates reported in Table 2 closely mirror those discussed for Table 1 without
control variables. For both countries, Model 1 excludes industry ￿xed e⁄ects and Model 2
includes them. For China, exposure to the Middle Wage Treatment decreased the probability
of giving a protectionist response by about 7 percentage points compared to exposure to the
Low Wage Treatment. This estimate is quite similar across Models 1 and 2. The estimated
di⁄erence for the High Wage Treatment is between 5 and 6 percentage points across the two
speci￿cations. This again suggests that there is no di⁄erence between the middle and high
wage treatments. It is worth noting the stability of these estimates despite the fact that the
speci￿cations with industry ￿xed e⁄ects have many fewer observations because individuals not
in the labor market cannot be coded for this variable. For the United States, the di⁄erences
25The results are qualitatively similar employing the Trade Opinion 2 measure.
26The variables are College Grad equal to one if the respondent graduated from college and zero if not,
Female equal to one if the respondent is female and zero if not, Age equal to age in years, and Personal
Income equal to an individual￿ s monthly (China) or annual (U.S.) income (see below for further details on the
construction of this variable).
27These are cities and counties in China and states in the U.S.
28These industry dummy variables are fairly aggregated in our Chinese data and include about 20 categories.
For the United States, we recorded the industry of employment for each working respondent using the North
American Industry Classi￿cation System at the three-digit level and there are over 100 industries in our data.
23across the treatments are statistically and substantively signi￿cant across all combinations
and the magnitudes are quite close to those reported in Table 1. Again, this is true even
in the case for Model 2 for which the industry ￿xed e⁄ects result in a great deal of missing
observations.
These experimental results in Tables 1 and 2 provide strong evidence that increasing the
average wage of the industry under consideration for trade protection reduces support for new
trade barriers in that industry. The random assignment of the treatments in the experiment
makes us con￿dent that these di⁄erences are not attributable to other characteristics of the
respondents or other selection e⁄ects. The result further provides evidence for one possible set
of explanations for why low-earning, less-skilled industries tend to be more heavily protected
across countries with di⁄erent factor endowments and political institutions: citizens, for
whatever reason, prefer to support the incomes of low-wage sectors more than high-wage
sectors and this preference is in￿ uential in the policymaking process. More generally, this
￿nding is consistent with our speci￿c explanation why low-earning, less-skilled industries tend
to be more heavily protected across lots of di⁄erent countries: inequality-averse citizens prefer
to support the incomes of low-wage sectors more than high-wage sectors. This interpretation,
however, should be made with some caution. First, these estimates do not provide direct
evidence of envy and/or altruism as de￿ned in our model. Second, there may be alternative
reasons why trade opinions vary with the average wage of the industry under consideration for
protection. Consequently, our interpretation of Tables 1 and 2 is that they report evidence
consistent with our argument though there could be other related factors driving preferences
in a similar direction. They do, nonetheless, constitute strong evidence that preferences
may be important in accounting for the puzzle of low-earning industries receiving more trade
protection across many countries. We now turn to more direct evidence of altruism and envy















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
China United States
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Middle Wage Treatment -0.068 -0.072 -0.089 -0.075
(0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.037)
0.005 0.007 0.000 0.043
High Wage Treatment -0.054 -0.059 -0.198 -0.164
(0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.036)
0.025 0.032 0.000 0.000
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Local/State Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E⁄ects No Yes No Yes
Interviewer Fixed E⁄ects Yes Yes NA NA
Standard Error of Regression 0.470 0.469 0.453 0.453
Observations 2,441 1,997 2,097 1,111
Table 2: Estimated E⁄ect of Average Wage of Industry on Support for Trade Protection,
Linear Probability Model Estimates. The table reports for China and the United States the
results of ordinary least squares regressions for the variable Trade Opinion 1 on Middle Wage
Treatment, High Wage Treatment, and various control variables. The omitted treatment is
the Low Wage Treatment. The demographic control variables include College, Female, Age,
and Income. For each model, the table reports the coe¢ cient estimates for each variable, their
heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors in parentheses, and p-values. A constant
term is included in each regression but not reported in the table.
264.3 Estimation of Envy and Altruism Parameters
To derive our statistical model for estimating the e⁄ect of envy and altruism on support for
sector-speci￿c trade protection, we start with the individual indirect utility function in our
model, Equation (3):
Zi(p) = 1 +
￿i(pi)
￿iN
























In order to estimate the parameters of this model, we need to introduce an error term
and specify its distribution. The error term should be thought to be composed primarily of
those factors in￿ uencing opinion about sector-speci￿c trade protection not included in our
model.
Zi(p) = 1 +
￿i(pi)
￿iN























;0g + ￿i (7)
We assume that ￿i is normally distributed and that it enters the function additively. We
further simplify our model in three ways. First, we omit the terms r(p) and s(p); which
represent per capita tari⁄ revenues and per capita consumer surplus. Neither argument
varies across individuals and so will be captured by the constant in our estimating equation.
Second, the survey question forces respondents to focus on one industry at a time and so
we consider only income di⁄erences between the individual and the average worker in this
industry. Consistent with the model, this assumes that changes in trade policy in one
industry do not a⁄ect income in other industries. Third, the term
￿i(pi)
￿iN is equal to the
portion of individual i￿ s income that varies across individuals/sectors and is denoted as Ii
27(and analogously for individual/sector j). These simpli￿cations leave us with:
Zi(p) = Ii ￿ ￿[maxfIj ￿ Ii;0g] ￿ ￿[maxfIi ￿ Ij;0g] + ￿i where i 6= j (8)
Let zF
i be the utility to individual i from introducing new trade barriers and zO
i be the
utility to individual i from the status quo policy with no new trade barriers We assume
that our survey respondents answer our question favoring or opposing new trade barriers by
selecting the policy option that yields the highest utility. Let Y ￿ ￿ zF
i ￿ zO
i . If y￿ > 0,
the individual favors new trade barriers and otherwise will be opposed. Further, let yi = 1
if y￿ > 0 and yi = 0 otherwise. Y ￿ is the di⁄erence between two normally distributed
variables and is itself normally distributed. As such, the probability that an individual favors
P(Y ￿ > 0) = P(Y = 1) or opposes P(Y ￿ ￿ 0) = P(Y = 0) new trade barriers can be derived
from the standard normal CDF. This yields:
P(Y = 1) = ￿(￿0 ￿ ￿[maxfIj ￿ Ii;0g] ￿ ￿[maxfIi ￿ Ij;0g]) (9)
where ￿(￿) is the standard normal CDF and ￿0 is a constant. Note that the income term
Ii =
￿i(pi)
￿iN drops out when zO
i is subtracted from zF
i because trade barriers in sector j do not
a⁄ect the income of individuals in other sectors in the model.
The variable Trade Opinion 1 described above is de￿ned to follow this estimation frame-
work and is set equal to 1 if the respondent favors new trade barriers and is set equal to 0 if
they are opposed. In both our surveys, we also measured annual personal income. In China,
the survey instrument places individuals into one of 16 monthly personal income categories.
We then de￿ned the actual magnitude of each respondent￿ s income as equal to the midpoint
of the income range in which they placed themselves. This variable, Personal Income, serves
as our measure of Ii. For the United States, our survey assigned respondents to one of 19
annual personal income categories and we constructed the variable Personal Income in the
same way as for the China data. The variable Other Income is equal to treatments in our
survey questions and takes on the three randomly assigned values of 1,000, 2,000, or 4,000
28yuan in China and 18,000, 40,000, or 80,000 dollars in the United States. This variable serves
as our measure of Ij. We de￿ne the variable Envy equal to Other Income minus Personal
Income if Other Income is greater than Personal Income and equal to zero if not. We de￿ne
the variable Altruism equal to Personal Income minus Other Income if Personal Income is
greater than Other Income and equal to zero if not.29 Thus, we have measures of each
argument in Equation (9) and our initial estimating equation is:
P(Y = 1) = ￿(￿0+￿Envy + ￿Altruism) (10)
We estimate this equation as a probit model and report heteroskedastic consistent stan-
dard errors.30 The ￿rst key hypothesis from our model is that ￿ < 0 because sector-speci￿c
trade protection will raise the income of workers in that industry, reducing the utility of in-
dividuals who have lower incomes than the industry under consideration for trade protection
(see Equation (4a) above). The second main hypothesis from our model is that ￿ > 0 because
sector-speci￿c trade protection will raise the income of workers in that industry, increasing
the utility of individuals who have higher incomes than the industry under consideration
for trade protection (see Equation (4b) above). In short, new trade barriers increase or
decrease inequality depending on your own income and thus the direction of our envy and
altruism parameters, although both indicating a form of inequality aversion, are in opposite
directions.31
Our initial speci￿cation follows directly from our theoretical framework. Given that our
substantive interest is in estimating the Envy and Altruism parameters, it is important to note
that this speci￿cation makes the usual strong identi￿cation assumptions of a cross-sectional
29All of these variables are measured in thousands.
30The preceding derivation could be adjusted for analysis of the ordered opinion measure Trade Opinion 2
and estimated with an ordered probit model or a regression. Our results below are qualitatively similar in
these alternative speci￿cations. We also calcluated bootstrap standard errors and found little di⁄erence in the
magnitudes of our standard errors.
31We note that our estimates of the envy and altruism parameters investigate whether the data from the
experiment are consistent with our theoretical framework. It is possible that an alternative theory, perhaps
an alternative theory of other regarding preferences would explain the data as well. We note though that
the results described below are more consistent with inequality aversion￿ envy and altruism￿ than a pure
altruism account.
29analysis. These assumptions would be violated if the model was incomplete and the omitted
factors were correlated with Envy or Altruism. Because Personal Income is a component
of the Envy and Altruism variables, and because personal income and its correlates such as
education have been shown to be associated with trade opinions, there is little doubt that
the estimates in this baseline speci￿cation are biased.
In a second, preferred speci￿cation, we add three additional controls. The ￿rst is Personal
Income; the second is an indicator variable, Personal Income Greater, equal to one if the
individual￿ s Personal Income is greater than the Other Income treatment which they received;
and the third is an interaction term between Personal Income Greater and Personal Income.
This speci￿cation recognizes that the Envy and Altruism variables are a function of Personal
Income, Other Income, and which one is greater than the other. The experimental treatments
ensure that Other Income is randomly assigned across respondents but Personal Income is
not. However, once we control for Personal Income, Personal Income Greater, and their
interaction, variation in the Envy and Altruism variables is driven exclusively by the random
assignment of the Other Income treatments from the survey experiment. This speci￿cation
has the substantial advantage of fully employing the experiment to identify our estimates
of the Envy and Altruism parameters and yields consistent estimates of the parameters
even if the model is incomplete.32 For this reason, although we report results for the
initial speci￿cation, we focus attention on the models that include Personal Income, Personal
Income Greater, and their interaction as controls. We also present additional results which
add control variables to this second speci￿cation.
Table 3 reports our main results for China. The estimates for Model 3 are for our ini-
tial speci￿cation, Equation (10). The estimates for both envy and altruism are small in
magnitude and statistically insigni￿cant. As discussed above, this speci￿cation follows from
the theoretical model but is likely biased because although the Other Income component of
Envy and Altruism is randomly assigned, the Personal Income component is not. Given
32Note that one potential concern is if there are heterogeneous treatment e⁄ects from the di⁄erent compo-
nents of the Envy and Altruism variables (see Dunning 2008 for a related discussion), this speci￿cation would
only estimate the e⁄ect from the Other Income component of Envy and Altruism.
30Probit Model Estimates
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates
Envy, ￿ -0.004 -0.022 -0.017 -0.018
(0.024) (0.030) (0.032) (0.040)
0.856 0.470 0.593 0.663
Altruism, ￿ -0.002 0.159 0.188 0.189
(0.021) (0.055) (0.060) (0.062)
0.925 0.004 0.002 0.002
Personal Income, ￿1 -0.039 0.005 -0.044
(0.040) (0.048) (0.063)
0.326 0.910 0.485
Personal Income Greater, ￿2 0.089 0.220 0.150
(0.120) (0.136) (0.166)
0.462 0.106 0.366
Personal Income Greater* -0.111 -0.172 -0.140
Personal Income, ￿3 (0.063) (0.070) (0.081)
0.077 0.015 0.083
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes
Local Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E⁄ects No No No Yes
Interviewer Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -1679.2 -1673.4 -1434.9 -1135.3
Observations 2,442 2,442 2,401 1,912
Table 3: Envy, Altruism, and Support for Trade Protection in China, Probit Estimates.
The Table reports the results of probit regressions for the variable Trade Opinion 1 on
Envy, Altruism, and various control variables. For each model, the table reports the probit
coe¢ cient estimates for each variable, their heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard errors
in parentheses, and p-values. A constant term is included in each regression but not reported
in the table.
31Probit Model Estimates
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient Coe¢ cient
Estimates Estimates Estimates Estimates
Envy, ￿ -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.012
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Altruism, ￿ -0.003 0.010 0.010 0.007
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.012 0.004 0.004 0.139
Personal Income, ￿1 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
0.003 0.016 0.110
Personal Income Greater, ￿2 0.268 0.219 0.028
(0.140) (0.143) (0.235)
0.056 0.125 0.905
Personal Income Greater ￿ -0.008 -0.007 -0.002
Personal Income, ￿3 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
0.033 0.063 0.765
Demographic Controls No No Yes Yes
State Fixed E⁄ects No No Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E⁄ects No No No Yes
Log-likelihood -1270.6 -1254.9 -1221.6 -566.3
Observations 2,097 2,097 2,091 999
Table 4: Envy, Altruism, and Support for Trade Protection in the United States, Probit
Estimates. The Table reports the results of probit regressions for the variable Trade Opinion
1 on Envy, Altruism, and various control variables. For each model, the table reports the
probit coe¢ cient estimates for each variable, their heteroskedastic-consistent robust standard
errors in parentheses, and p-values. A constant term is included in each regression but not
reported in the table.
32the existing literature on the correlates of trade opinions, there are very good reasons to
believe that there are unobserved and omitted factors in￿ uencing trade opinions which are
correlated with Envy or Altruism. The Model 4 speci￿cation in Table 3 addresses this issue
by adding the variables Personal Income, Personal Income Greater and their interaction.
Once we add these controls, variation in the Envy and Altruism variables is driven only by
the random assignment of the Other Income treatments from the survey experiment and so
we can be con￿dent our estimates are not biased by omitted unobserved factors in￿ uencing
trade opinions.
The estimates for Model 4 indicate that the estimates for both envy and altruism are
correctly signed but that only the estimate for altruism is statistically and substantively
signi￿cant (the probit coe¢ cient estimate for ￿ is 0.159 with a standard error of 0.055).
This indicates, that all else equal, individuals with incomes greater than the income of the
average worker in the industry under consideration for protection are more supportive of
sector-speci￿c trade barriers, the greater their income is relative to the income of workers
in the industry which may be protected. To get a sense of the magnitude of this e⁄ect,
the impact of increasing the Altruism measure from 0￿ the value assigned to the variable
when the respondent has an income less than or equal to the average income in the industry
under consideration for protection￿ to 2.68￿ a two standard deviation increase equivalent
to an income di⁄erence of 2,680 yuan￿ on the probability of supporting new trade barriers,
holding all other variables at their means is 0.165 (standard error of 0.057). This means that
the probability of favoring new trade barriers increases 16.5 percentage points, which is over
a 37% increase from the overall mean of the Trade Opinion 1 measure.33
Table 3 also reports two additional speci￿cations which add various control variables
to Model 4. The Model 5 speci￿cation adds the variables College Grad, Female, and Age
de￿ned above and ￿xed e⁄ects for geographical location and interviewer while the Model 6
speci￿cation also adds ￿xed e⁄ects for industry of employment. Not surprisingly, given the
design of the experiment, our estimates of the envy and altruism parameters ￿ and ￿ in
33This estimate was calculated by simulating from the sampling distribution of the probit parameter esti-
mates, following the procedures described in King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000),
33Models 5 and 6 are quite similar to those reported for Model 4. Overall, the estimates in
Table 3 provide robust evidence that in China, altruism has a positive e⁄ect on support for
trade protection.
Table 4 reports our main results for the U.S. The estimates for Model 3 indicate negative
and statistically signi￿cant coe¢ cients for both the Envy and Altruism variables. The Envy
result is consistent with our theoretical expectations while the Altruism estimate is not.
However, as discussed in the results for China, this speci￿cation follows from the theoretical
model but is likely biased given what we know about determinants of trade policy opinions and
the assignment of the Personal Income component of the Envy and Altruism variables. The
Model 4 speci￿cation in Table 4 addresses this potentional problem by adding the variables
Personal Income, Personal Income Greater and their interaction. Once we add these controls,
variation in the Envy and Altruism variables is driven only by the random assignment of the
Other Income treatments from the survey experiment and so we can be con￿dent that our
estimates are not biased by the omission of unobserved factors in￿ uencing trade opinions.
The results for Model 4 indicate that the estimates for both envy and altruism are correctly
signed and statistically and substantively signi￿cant The estimated probit coe¢ cient, ￿, for
the variable Envy is equal to -0.010 with a standard error of 0.002. This indicates that,
all else equal, individuals are less supportive of sector-speci￿c trade barriers, the greater the
income of the average worker in the industry under consideration for protection relative to
the survey respondent. The magnitude of the envy e⁄ect is substantial. To get a sense of
the substantive magnitude of this estimate, the e⁄ect of increasing the Envy measure from
0￿ the value assigned to the variable when the respondent has an income greater than or
equal to the average income in the industry under consideration for trade protection￿ to
48.8￿ a two standard deviation increase equivalent to an income di⁄erence of $48,800￿ on
the probability of supporting new trade barriers, holding all other variables at their means
is -0.163 (standard error of 0.025). This means that the probability of favoring new trade
barriers falls 16.3 percentage points, which is almost a 53% decrease from the overall mean
of the Trade Opinion 1 measure.
34The estimated probit coe¢ cient, ￿, for the variable Altruism is equal to 0.010 with a
standard error of 0.004. The magnitude of this e⁄ect is also substantively signi￿cant. The
e⁄ect of increasing the Altruism measure from 0￿ the value assigned to the variable when
the respondent has an income less than or equal to the average income in the industry under
consideration for trade protection￿ to 48.4￿ a two standard deviation increase equivalent to
an income di⁄erence of $48,400￿ on the probability of supporting new trade barriers, holding
all other variables at their means is 0.182 (standard error of 0.065). This means that the
probability of favoring new trade barriers increases 18.2 percentage points, which is about a
59% increase from the overall mean of the Trade Opinion 1 measure.
Table 4 also reports two additional speci￿cations which add various control variables
to Model 4. The Model 5 speci￿cation adds the variables College Grad, Female, and Age
de￿ned above and ￿xed e⁄ects for the state of the respondent. The Model 6 speci￿cation
also adds ￿xed e⁄ects for industry of employment.34 Our estimates of the envy and altruism
parameters ￿ and ￿ are quite similar to those reported for Model 4. So although education and
sex in￿ uence trade opinions, their inclusion makes little di⁄erence for our estimates because
conditional on Personal Income, Personal Income Greater, and their interaction, variation
in Envy and Altruism is randomly assigned and thus uncorrelated with our measures of
education, sex, or any other determinants of trade opinion. Overall, the estimates in Table
4 provide robust evidence that envy and altruism have an important e⁄ect on support for
trade protection in our U.S. data.
Taken together the results in both China and the United States strongly support the
overall argument of this paper. One reason that lower-earning sectors receive more trade
protection around the world may be that citizens support trade protection more for low-
earning sectors. This support could obviously be in￿ uential in a democratic setting but it
could also be in￿ uential in an environment in which special interests dominate￿ whether it
be in a democratic or non-democratic regime. Furthermore, when we combine our model
34The addition of the industry dummy variables decreases the number observations even more than in the
analyses reported in Table 2 because the probit model drops from the analysis any observations for which an
industry dummy variable perfectly predicts opinion.
35with our experiment, our empirical results are consistent with inequality aversion￿ in the
form of envy and altruism￿ accounting for why individuals are more supportive of protection
for lower-earning sectors.
4.4 Envy, Atruism, and Ine¢ cient Policy
One of the distinctive features of trade policy is that it is an ine¢ cient policy instrument for
redistributing income. In fact, why governments use trade policy at all to redistribute in-
come when other policies could do so more e¢ ciently is a central question in the international
political economy literature. To explore further the importance of inequality aversion in un-
derstanding trade policy preferences, and perhaps shed some light on why individual citizens
support costly redistribution, we conducted a small follow-up experiment with a subset of
our U.S. respondents. We asked the following question immediately after the respondents
answered the initial trade question analyzed above:
Considering this same industry in which the average worker makes X dollars
per year, economists have estimated that to raise this worker￿ s salary by 5,000
dollars per year through new trade barriers such as import taxes and quotas, it
would cost Y dollars per year to the US economy in terms of higher consumer
prices and higher costs for other industries for each worker helped. Do you still
favor or oppose these new trade barriers?
IF FAVOR: Do you strongly favor or only somewhat favor new trade barriers
for this industry?
IF OPPOSE: Do you strongly oppose or only somewhat oppose new trade
barriers for this industry?
The value of X was set equal to the same value initially assigned to that respondent
(18,000, 40,000, or 80,000 dollars) in our main question described above and the value of Y
was set equal to either 5,000 dollars for the e¢ cient redistribution or 7,500 for the ine¢ cient
redistribution. This experiment allows us to investigate whether the pattern of trade pref-
erences that we observe in our main experiment remain even when the ine¢ ciency of the
policy is made salient to respondents.35 The evidence presented thus far already suggests
35One caveat which should be kept in mind in thinking about this second experiment is that our survey
respondents may have a tendency to stick to their original policy opinion in order to remain consistent in their
36that inequality aversion helps explain support for ine¢ cient redistributive trade policy, but
our second experiment makes the ine¢ ciency unambiguous.
Table 5 presents the key results from this experiment, focusing on the results for the
variable Trade Opinion 3 which records support for increased trade barriers as a 1 and
codes opposition as a 0. The ￿rst panel reports the mean estimates and standard errors for
those respondents that received the e¢ cient prime of $5,000 and for those that received the
ine¢ cient prime of $7,500. Making the ine¢ ciency of trade policy more salient moderately
reduces support for protection from 0.28 to 0.24 of respondents. Given the sample size in this
second experiment, this di⁄erence has a p-value of 0.13 (the di⁄erence for the full ordered
responses has a p-value 0.04).
Our main interest is in whether our results indicating the importance of social concerns
in opinion formation about trade are robust when individuals are primed about the ine¢ -
ciency of trade policy. The second panel in Table 5 reports the di⁄erences across treatment
groups under the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient prime. Crucially, the estimates under the ine¢ -
cient prime are 0.115, 0.182, and 0.067 for the low-wage minus middle-wage treatment, the
low-wage minus high-wage treatment, and middle-wage minus high-wage treatment respec-
tively. These di⁄erences are in the predicted direction, are of similar magnitudes as in our
main experiment, and are statistically sign￿cant at the 0.01, 0.00, and 0.11 levels. Under
the e¢ cient policy prime, the results indicate a signi￿cant di⁄erence between the low and
high-wage treatments and middle and high-wage treatments but not between the low and
middle-wage treatments. Thus, if anything, the average wage of workers in the industry
under consideration is more important for understanding preferences when the ine¢ ciency
of the policy is salient. This strengthens our interpretation that our main results indicate
that social concerns are important for understanding why individuals are more or less likely
to support costly redistributions. The third panel in Table 5 reports the regression estimates
for the Middle Wage Treatment and High Wage Treatment variables.employing the Model 1
views. We note, though, that almost 20% of our respondents changed positions from support to opposition or
vice-versa. Further, as we discuss below there is heterogeneity in our results across the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient
prime suggesting individuals were willing to respond to the new information.
37E¢ cient Ine¢ cient
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Mean 0.277 (0.019) 0.236 (0.019)
Observations 530 525
Di⁄erence Estimates
E¢ cient Ine¢ cient
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Low Treatment - Middle Treatment 0.016 (0.049) 0.115 (0.047)
Low Treatment - High Treatment 0.119 (0.047) 0.182 (0.045)
Middle Treatment - High Treatment 0.102 (0.046) 0.067 (0.042)
OLS Estimates of Treatment E⁄ects
E¢ cient Ine¢ cient
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Middle Wage Treatment 0.008 (0.052) -0.149 (0.052)
High Wage Treatment -0.099 (0.055) -0.209 (0.050)
Standard Error of Regression 0.439 0.427
Observations 481 493
Probit Estimates of Envy and Altruism
E¢ cient Ine¢ cient
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Envy, ￿ -0.004 (0.003) -0.008 (0.004)
Altruism, ￿ -0.002 (0.007) 0.009 (0.008)
Log-likelihood -280.0 -259.7
Observations 481 493
Table 5: Support for Trade Protection Under E¢ cient and Ine¢ cent Prime. This table re-
ports descriptive statistics and regression analyses for the variable Trade Opinion 3 under the
e¢ cient prime of $5,000 and the ine¢ cient prime of $7,500. The di⁄erence estimates report
di⁄erence-in-means tests assuming unequal variances. The regression estimates adopt the
Model 1 speci￿cation from Table 2 and the probit estimates employ the Model 4 speci￿cation
from Table 4.
38speci￿cation which includes demographic controls and state ￿xed e⁄ects. These estimates
con￿rm the pattern observed in the di⁄erence estimates.
The fourth and ￿nal panel in Table 5 presents probit estimates of the envy and altruism
parameters employing our Model 4 speci￿cation. Again, focusing our attention on the
estimates for the respondents who received the ine¢ cient prime, we ￿nd our estimates quite
similar to those reported in Table 4. The estimate for the envy parameter is -0.008 (with a
standard error of 0.004) compared to the Table 4 estimate of -0.010. The altruism estimate
is 0.009 compared to 0.010 in Table 4. However, the altruism estimate here is imprecisely
estimated with a standard error almost as large as the coe¢ cient.36 Again, when we compare
these estimates across the e¢ cient and ine¢ cient prime, the results suggest, if anything, envy
and altruism are more important for understanding policy opinions when it is salient that
the policy is ine¢ cient.
5 Conclusion
Trade and economic policymaking more generally foment so much political activity and the-
atre because of the signi￿cant distributional consequences at stake. One important class of
explanations for why governments adopt policies that support the incomes of some citizens
but not others is that these polcies re￿ ect the preferences of particular actors￿ voters, in-
dustry lobbies, politicians, etc.￿ in the policymaking process. An essential element of any
explanation of policy outcomes is what accounts for the preferences of the relevant actors.
In trade and virtually all areas of economic policymaking, self-interest￿ how policy a⁄ects an
individual￿ s economic welfare￿ is a compelling place to start in explaining support for policy
alternatives.
Nonetheless, this does not preclude the possibility that economic policy preferences are
also in￿ uenced by other-regarding preferences. Our paper investigates the possibility that
social concerns in￿ uence policy opinions in trade, an important area of economic policymak-
36Given the smaller sample sizes here, we would emphasize the similarities in the magnitude of the estimates
rather than imprecision of the altruism estimate.
39ing, and that these preferences may help explain policy outcomes not easily accounted for by
exisiting theories.
Speci￿cally, we address the question of why in so many countries lower-earning, less-
skilled intensive industries receive relatively high levels of trade protection. What is especially
puzzling is that this pattern of protection holds even in low-income countries in which less-
skilled labor is likely to be the relatively abundant factor of production and therefore would
be expected in many standard political-economy frameworks to receive relatively low, not
high, levels of protection.
We o⁄er an explanation of this puzzle: individual preferences that display inequity aver-
sion. Under a variety of models of the policymaking process, inequity aversion on the part
of individual citizens would make it more likely that governments favor lower-earning, less-
skilled intensive industries in setting trade policy. To provide empirical evidence in support
of our explanation, we analyze policy preferences in national samples of citizens in China and
the United States. First, we show that preferences aggregated across all respondents in each
country vary systematically with the treatment income of industry workers: industries with
lower-income workers receive broader support for trade protection. Second, we derive from
our model and estimate an equation of policy preferences, ￿nding that individuals have the
social preferences of altruism and envy assumed in our model. Econometrically identifying
these preferences lends considerable support to our explanation of the trade-policy puzzle,
and suggests that social concerns as well as self-interest in￿ uence opinion formation about
trade policy.
In addition to contributing to the trade policy literature, our paper provides a new
methodology for investigating the role of envy and altruism in determining policy prefer-
ences. This general strategy could be applied to many other areas of economic policymaking
for which envy and altruism may be in￿ uential in opinion formation. Our ￿ndings for trade
policy recommend greater attention to how social concerns may in￿ uence the policymaking
process across many areas of government economic policymaking.
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